Special Education Law 101 - Part XV Burden of Persuasion

This is another in a periodic series on the nuts and bolts of special education law.  The series is intended as an overview of key concepts for beginners and a review for those readers who have been around the block.

The citations for information about due process hearings are:IDEA, § 615(f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507 to .515

Concerning the burden of persuasion at due process hearings...

  

Schaffer v. Weast 546 U.S. 49, 126 S.Ct. 528, 44 IDELR 150 (2005). The Court held that the burden of persuasion in an IDEA due process hearing is upon the party challenging the IEP.  The “burden of persuasion” involves which party loses if the evidence is closely balanced.  In any civil legal proceeding, if the evidence for both sides is equal, the party with the burden of persuasion loses.  The Court exempted from its decision, however, the burden of persuasion applicable in those states that have laws or regulations placing the burden upon the school district. Note that the burden of persuasion is not the same as the burden of going forward, which concerns which party goes first in presenting evidence.  To increase confusion, both the burden of persuasion and the burden of going forward are loosely referred to as "burden of proof" in legal circles.  (I'm not sure why!)

Concerning the IDEA due process hearing process, the Court in Weast noted that such hearings are deliberately informal.  The Court went on to note that the IDEA due process hearing was set up by Congress with the intention of giving the hearing officers the flexibility they need to ensure that each side can fairly present its evidence.

Related articles

• Special Education Law 101 - Part XIV Expenses and Attorney's Fees
• Special Education Law 101 - Part XIII Legal Representation
• Special Education Law 101 - Part XII Stay Put
• Special Education Law 101 - Part XI Compensatory Education
• Acronyms & Special Education - An Ethical Issue?

Special Education Law 101 - Part XIII Legal Representation

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This is another post in our ongoing series on the basics of special education law.  Please let us know how you are enjoying this series.  We feel that this is a good introduction for newbies and a good refresher for seasoned pros.  

The federal regulations implementing IDEA provide that parties to due process hearings have a right to be accompanied by legal counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of kids with disabilities "...except that whether parties have the right to be represented by non-attorneys at due process hearings is determined under State law." 34 C.F.R. §300.512.  This regulation was changed recently to reverse a previous long standing policy of the department of Education that had permitted non-attorney advocates to fully represent parents in the past. To be clear a parent may still have an advocate present to advise her, but the advocate may not be able to represent the parent depending upon state law.

There is one US Supreme Court decision concerning legal representation: 

In Winkelman by Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist  550 U.S. 516, 127 S.Ct 1994,  47 IDELR 281 (5/21/2007) the Supreme Court ruled by a 7 to 2 margin that the IDEA grants independent enforceable rights to parents as well as students.  Accordingly, the court concluded that parents may pursue IDEA appeals in federal court without being represented by an attorney.  NOTE: This decision applies only to federal court appeals of due process decisions.  All parties agreed that a parent may appear at a due process hearing without counsel.

Related articles

• Special Education Law 101 - Part XII Stay Put
• Special Education Law 101 - Part XI Compensatory Education
• Special Education Law 101 - Part X
• Special Education Law 101 - Part IX
• Big Decision: Statute of Limitations
• Seclusion & Restraints Back in the News

Special Education Law 101 - Part XII Stay Put

Seal of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

This is another post in our ongoing series on the basics of special education law.  Please let us know how you are enjoying this series.  We feel that this is a good introduction for newbies and a good refresher for seasoned pros.  

Today we talk about the stay put provision. One of the basic concepts in this area of the law, yet also one of the most misunderstood.

Stay Put

              IDEA § 615 (j) provides that (except in certain discipline cases), during the pendency of any due process or court proceedings pursuant to this section, unless the parties agree otherwise, the student ‘…shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child…”  This is commonly referred to as the stay put provision.  The stay put placement is the last agreed upon IEP, unless the parties agree otherwise. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.518.

              The Supreme Court interpreted and endorsed the stay put decision in the case of Honig v. Doe 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 594, 559 IDELR 231 (1988).  In that decision, the Supreme Court, noting the Congressional intent in preventing the exclusion of disabled students and reiterating the importance of the procedural safeguards under the IDEA, refused to read a dangerousness exception into the stay put provision.  Honig v. Doe, supra.  (NOTE; please note that IDEA’04 now has provisions pertaining to danger/injury.)

              John M. by Christine M & Michael M v. Bd of Educ of the Evanston Township HS Dist No. 202 502 F.3d 708, 48 IDELR 177 (7th Cir. 9/17/7) The Seventh Circuit noted that determining “then current educational placement’ is an inexact science requiring a fact driven approach.  Respect for the purpose of the stay put provision requires focus upon the child’s educational needs so the educational status quo for a “growing, learning, young person” often makes rigid adherence to a particular educational methodology an impossibility.  Stay put, therefore, requires flexibility in interpreting the educational placement per the last agreed upon IEP and flexibility concerning the child’s needs.

                 In other recent Circuit Court decisions: KD by CL v. Dept of Educ, State of Hawaii 58 IDELR 2 (9th Cir 12/27/11) Ninth Circuit held that the language of a settlement agreement prevented a private school from being the “as agreed” stay put placement.  The agreement provided that the LEA would pay for a private school program for a specific period of time rather than merely agreeing to place the child in a private school. Therefore, LEA had no obligation to pay for the private school after the period of time designated in the agreement lapsed; and in Anchorage Sch Dist v. MP by MP 689 F.3d 1047, 59 IDELR 91 (9th Cir 7/19/12) Ninth Circuit ruled that the school district denied FAPE by failing to conduct IEPT meetings at least once per year despite a number of dphs and complaints pending by the parents.  Stay put did apply, but stay put only affects the educational program in general, and the IEPT could have discussed other items.

Related articles

• Special Education Law 101 - Part XI Compensatory Education
• Special Education Law 101 - Part X
• Special Education Law 101 - Part IX
• Special Education Law 101 - Part VII
• Special Education Law 101 - Part VIII
• Special Education Law 101 - Part VI
• Beware Unpublished Decisions!

Special Education Law 101 - Part IX

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This is the most recent post in the continuing series that is meant to be an introduction to special education law.  In today's post we will be discussing discipline of students with disabilities.  People often ask why disciplinary actions are regulated by the special education law.  The reason is that before passage of the law's predecessor, it was common for school officials to exclude children with disabilities by expelling them and giving them long suspensions. This series of abuses was reflected in the legislative history of the law.  

 

Discipline is one area that seems to cause folks to develop stomach problems (sorta like the rule against perpetuities in law school), but it isn't really as hard as we seem to make it.  Let me know if this explanation helps.

                                                   Discipline Issues

The IDEA imposes special rules that govern the discipline of students with a disability.  The basic rule is that a special education student may not have her placement changed (i.e., suspensions of more than 10 days or expulsion) for conduct that is a manifestation of her disability.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(F).  If the behavior is not a manifestation of the student’s disability, the student may be disciplined in the same manner and for the same duration as children without disabilities.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(C).

One exception is that, regardless of manifestation, the schools may remove a student to an interim alternative educational setting,  sometimes referred to as “IAES,” for up to 45 school days if (1) the student possesses a weapon at school; or (2) the student possesses or uses or sells illegal drugs at school; or (3) the student has inflicted “serious bodily injury” upon another person while at school.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(G).  The schools may also ask a hearing officer to change the placement of a student with a disability to an IAES if remaining in the current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the student or others.  IDEA, § 615(k)(3)(A) and (B).

              Another cardinal rule in the discipline area is that regardless of whether the conduct of a student was a manifestation of the student’s disability, where a student with a disability is removed from his current placement, the schools must continue to provide educational services to ensure FAPE for the student and to enable the student to continue to participate in the general curriculum although in another setting.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(D).  See generally regarding discipline issues, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530 – 300.537. 

 

                The Supreme Court dealt with discipline issues and endorsed the stay put provision in the case of Honig v. Doe 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 594, 559 IDELR 231 (1988).  In that decision, the Supreme Court, noting the Congressional intent in preventing the exclusion of disabled students and reiterating the importance of the procedural safeguards under the IDEA, refused to read a dangerousness exception into the stay put provision. The high Court outlines the history of abuses of the discipline of kids with disabilities in that decision.

 

 In District of Columbia v. Doe ex rel Doe 611 F.3d 888, 54 IDELR 275 (DC Cir 7/6/10) DC Circuit ruled that HO did not exceed his authority where he reduced a disciplinary suspension. HO reduced a 45 day suspension to an 11 day suspension noting the trivial nature of the infraction and finding that the more lengthy suspension denied FAPE to the student.

Related articles

• Special Education Law 101 - Part II
• Special Education Law 101 - Part III
• Special Education Law 101 - Part IV
• Special Education Law 101 - Part V
• Special Education Law 101 - Part VII
• Special Education Law 101 - Part VI
• Special Education Law 101 - Part VIII
• Big Decision: Statute of Limitations

Special Education Law 101 - Part VII

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This is another post in our current series introducing readers to special education law's key concepts.  Today's post is about related services. This phrase is almost always preceded by "special education and..."

Let me know if you are enjoying this series. For some it is an introduction.  For others it is a chance to brush up on the key concepts...

Related Services

The IDEA defines related services as follows:

(A)  IN GENERAL- The term ‘related services’ means transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech-language pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, school nurse services designed to enable a child with a disability to receive a free and appropriate public education as described in the individualized education program of the child, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education…

(B)  EXCEPTION—The term does not include a medical device that is surgically implanted, or the replacement of such device.

IDEA, § 602(26).  See, 34 C.F.R. § 300.34.

              The issue of related services has resulted in two decisions by the United States Supreme Court.   The first decision was  Irving Independent Sch. Dist. v. Tatro  468 U.S. 883, 104 S.Ct. 3371, 555 IDELR 511 (1984).  The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals holding that a procedure known as clean intermittent catheterization was a related service because the student could not attend school without it and, therefore, without the procedure she could not benefit from special education.  Tatro, supra.  The Supreme Court also affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals that clean intermittent catheterization is not exempted by the medical services provision because the procedure did not have to be performed by a doctor, it could be done by a layperson with an hour of training. Tatro, supra.

              The second decision was Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F.  526 U.S. 66, 119 S.Ct. 992, 29 IDELR 966 (1999).  In this case, the Supreme Court held that urinary bladder catheterization and suctioning of tracheotomy plus various monitoring was a related service.  Garret F., supra.  Applying the “bright line” test of the Tatro decision, the Court held that because the related services did not have to be performed by a physician, the medical services exclusion did not apply and the schools were required to provide the services for the student.  Garret F., supra.  The Court specifically and emphatically rejected the argument raised by the schools that the cost of providing the services was a defense.  Garret F., supra. 

              In Marshall Joint Sch Dist No.2 v CD by Brian & Traci D 616 F. 3d 632, 54 IDELR 307 (7th Cir 8/2/10), the Seventh Circuit  concluded that the student did not need specialized instruction.  Any need for PT or OT, therefore, was not relevant.

Related articles

• Back to the Future: Special Ed Law 101
• Special Education Law 101 - Part I
• Special Education Law 101 - Part II
• Special Education Law 101 - Part III
• Special Education Law 101 - Part IV
• Special Education Law 101 - Part V
• Special Education Law 101 - Part VI