Showing posts with label Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Show all posts

Sequestration Will Hurt Kids With Disabilities

English: View of Capitol Hill from the U.S. Su...
English: View of Capitol Hill from the U.S. Supreme Court Česky: Pohled na Kapitol z budovy Nejvyššího soudu Spojených států (Photo credit: Wikipedia)















Sequestration starts today unless the Congress acts.  It will hurt the education of children with disabilities!

How will IDEA be affected? Under sequestration, federal funding for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act will be reduced by $1,053,600,000 in 2013, or 28 percent of the total reduction to education programs. 

You can view an analysis and explanation by our friends at IDEA money watch here.

You can see the amount of money that your state  and the projected number of special ed staff will lose on this chart.

Now would be a good time to call your congressmen and senators and tell them to fix this.
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Special Education Law 101 - Part X

James A. Bennett's Private School, Butte, Mont...
James A. Bennett's Private School, Butte, Montana (1901) (Photo credit: Butte-Silver Bow Public Library)
 
 
 
This is another installment in our continuing series on the basics of special education law.  Today we enter the mysterious world of unilateral placements.  If the parents (or adult student) win a due process hearing, the two most common types of relief are compensatory education and reimbursement for a unilateral placement.  Today we will take a hard look at the latter remedy.

Unilateral Placements

In the case of Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dept. of Educ., et. al. 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 556 IDELR 389 (1985), the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the IDEA permitted courts to award reimbursement to parents when the IEP developed by the schools is not appropriate and the parent removes the student from public school and places him in a private school that does provide FAPE.  Noting that the statutory provisions of the IDEA confer broad equitable powers upon the courts to fashion an appropriate remedy, and the fact that judicial review of IDEA cases often takes years, the Supreme Court held that the IDEA does empower courts to award such reimbursement.  Burlington, supra.

In Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Shannon Carter, et. al. 510 U.S. 7, 114 S.Ct. 361, 20 IDELR 532 (1993), the Supreme Court was faced with a unilateral placement case in which the public schools provided an inappropriate education leading to a unilateral placement at a private school that provided an appropriate education for the student but that did not meet some of the requirements of the SEA (specifically state approval of the private school.)  The Supreme Court held that courts may award reimbursement in these cases.  Carter, supra.

In Forrest Grove Sch Dist v. TA 129 S.Ct. 2484, 52 IDELR 151 (U.S.  6/22/9)   The Supreme Court held that it is not a prerequisite to reimbursement under IDEA that a child have been previously enrolled in and receive services from a public school. The Court noted that under its previous rulings in Burlington and Carter, courts have broad authority to grant appropriate relief when there has been a violation of IDEA.  The Court held that the 1997 amendments do not limit that authority. The ambiguous language of the provision at issue was not sufficient to effectuate a repeal by implication of Burlington and Carter.


     The IDEA now provides that a hearing officer or court may order an LEA to reimburse parents for a unilateral placement if the hearing officer or court finds that the LEA had not made FAPE available to the student in a timely manner prior to the enrollment in the private school.  IDEA, § 612 (a)(10)(C)(ii).  Such reimbursement may be reduced or denied if the parents failed at the last IEP meeting to reject the proposed placement and state their intent to enroll the child in private school at public expense, IDEA, §  612 (a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa); or if they fail to give written notice to the LEA of their  rejection of the proposed placement and state their intent to enroll the child in private school at public expense 10 business days prior to removal, IDEA, §  612 (a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(bb); or if the parents fail to make the student available for an evaluation, IDEA, §  612 (a)(10)(C)(iii)(II); or upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the parents, IDEA, §  612 (a)(10)(C)(iii)(III).  Reimbursement shall not be reduced or denied for failure to give notice if the school prevented the parent from providing such notice, IDEA, §  612 (a)(10)(C)(iv)(I)(aa); or if the parents were not provided with written procedural safeguards stating this notice requirement, IDEA, §  612 (a)(10)(C)(iv)(I)(bb); or if compliance with the notice clause would likely result in physical harm to the child, IDEA, §  612 (a)(10)(C)(iv)(I)(cc).  Within the discretion of the hearing officer or court, reimbursement may or may not be reduced or denied if the parents are illiterate or cannot write in English, IDEA, §  612 (a)(10)(C)(iv)(II)(aa); or if compliance with this clause would likely result in serious emotional harm to the child, IDEA, §  612 (a)(10)(C)(iv)(II)(bb).  See also, 34 C.F.R. § 300.148. 

The general rule, then, is that reimbursement for a unilateral placement may be awarded where a parent/student proves the following:1) the school district denied FAPE to the student or otherwise violated IDEA; 2) the parent's private school placement for the student is appropriate; and 3) equitable factors do not preclude the relief.  Forrest Grove Sch Dist v. TA 557 U.S. 230, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 52 IDELR 151 (U.S.  6/22/9)
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Special Education Law 101 - Part IX

English: Seal of the Supreme Court of the Unit...
(Photo credit: Wikipedia)
This is the most recent post in the continuing series that is meant to be an introduction to special education law.  In today's post we will be discussing discipline of students with disabilities.  People often ask why disciplinary actions are regulated by the special education law.  The reason is that before passage of the law's predecessor, it was common for school officials to exclude children with disabilities by expelling them and giving them long suspensions. This series of abuses was reflected in the legislative history of the law.  
 
Discipline is one area that seems to cause folks to develop stomach problems (sorta like the rule against perpetuities in law school), but it isn't really as hard as we seem to make it.  Let me know if this explanation helps.

                                                   Discipline Issues

The IDEA imposes special rules that govern the discipline of students with a disability.  The basic rule is that a special education student may not have her placement changed (i.e., suspensions of more than 10 days or expulsion) for conduct that is a manifestation of her disability.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(F).  If the behavior is not a manifestation of the student’s disability, the student may be disciplined in the same manner and for the same duration as children without disabilities.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(C).

One exception is that, regardless of manifestation, the schools may remove a student to an interim alternative educational setting,  sometimes referred to as “IAES,” for up to 45 school days if (1) the student possesses a weapon at school; or (2) the student possesses or uses or sells illegal drugs at school; or (3) the student has inflicted “serious bodily injury” upon another person while at school.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(G).  The schools may also ask a hearing officer to change the placement of a student with a disability to an IAES if remaining in the current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the student or others.  IDEA, § 615(k)(3)(A) and (B).

              Another cardinal rule in the discipline area is that regardless of whether the conduct of a student was a manifestation of the student’s disability, where a student with a disability is removed from his current placement, the schools must continue to provide educational services to ensure FAPE for the student and to enable the student to continue to participate in the general curriculum although in another setting.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(D).  See generally regarding discipline issues, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530 – 300.537. 
 
                The Supreme Court dealt with discipline issues and endorsed the stay put provision in the case of Honig v. Doe 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 594, 559 IDELR 231 (1988).  In that decision, the Supreme Court, noting the Congressional intent in preventing the exclusion of disabled students and reiterating the importance of the procedural safeguards under the IDEA, refused to read a dangerousness exception into the stay put provision. The high Court outlines the history of abuses of the discipline of kids with disabilities in that decision.
 
 In District of Columbia v. Doe ex rel Doe 611 F.3d 888, 54 IDELR 275 (DC Cir 7/6/10) DC Circuit ruled that HO did not exceed his authority where he reduced a disciplinary suspension. HO reduced a 45 day suspension to an 11 day suspension noting the trivial nature of the infraction and finding that the more lengthy suspension denied FAPE to the student.


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Special Education Law 101 - Part VIII

Seal of the United States Court of Appeals for...
Seal of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the most recent post in the continuing series on  an introduction to special education law.  The series is meant to be a solid introduction for newbies as well as a good review for seasoned special ed law vets. In today's post we will be discussing the transition services that must be given when a special education student nears graduation.


  Transition

              The IDEA defines transition services as a coordinated set of activities designed to be a results oriented process that focuses upon the individual child’s needs, strengths and preferences.  IDEA, § 602 (34).  Not later than the first IEP to be in effect when the child is 16 years old and each year thereafter, the IDEA requires that the IEP contain measurable post secondary goals; the transition services needed to achieve those goals; and beginning at one year before the child reaches the age of majority, a statement that the student has been informed regarding transfer of rights.  IDEA § 614 (d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII).  34 C.F.R. § 300.43, 300.320(b) Policy 2419, Ch. 5, § 2(F).
 
 
Note: When IDEA was reauthorized in 2004 the definition of transition was changed by Congress from an "outcome" oriented process to a "results" oriented process.  Don't these two words mean exactly the same thing?  Any thoughts? 

See, Questions and Answers on Secondary Transition 57 IDELR 231 (OSERS 9/1/11); In Park Hill Sch Dist v. Dass ex rel DD & KD 655 F.3d 762, 57 IDELR 121 (8th Cir. 9/9/11), the Eighth Circuit ruled that a transition plan is required by IDEA only for 16+ students regarding life after school, but not for students returning to public school.
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